

Cost Sharing in Higher Education in Tanzania: Fact or Fiction?

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Introduction

Cost sharing in higher education has been defined as "...a shift in the burden of higher education costs from being borne exclusively or predominantly by government, or taxpayers, to being shared with parents and students" (Johnstone 2003a: 351). Johnstone (2003a, 20004a) identifies various forms of cost sharing adopted in both developed and developing countries, including: (1) the introduction of tuition fees where public higher education was formerly free; (2) sharp increases in tuition where public higher education tuition has already existed; (3) the imposition of user charges to recover the expenses of formerly subsidized food and accommodations; (4) the diminution of student grants or scholarships; (5) an increase in the effective recovery of student loans; and (6) the official encouragement of tuition-dependent private higher education sector to absorb some of the higher educational demand.

A variation on the implementation of tuition fees--especially popular in countries that are ideologically and politically opposed to tuition fees but that acknowledge nonetheless an urgent need for some tuition fee revenue--are policies that preserve free tuition for students admitted at the top of the competitive admission examinations (sometimes referred to as "governmentally-sponsored" students), but that allow universities to admit others scoring below the cut-off scores *for a fee*. These fee-paying students and the programs that admit them—most notably in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania (and also in many of the formerly Communist countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe)--may be called *parallel degree*, or *third party*, or *privately-sponsored*, or *dual tuition* students and/or programs. This form of cost-sharing

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in higher education--maximizing enrollments of fee-paying students—has been particularly successful at two prominent East African public universities: Makerere University in Uganda and the University of Nairobi in Kenya¹ (Ssebuwufu, 2002; Kiamba, 2003).

Tuition fees in public higher education, as Johnstone (2002a: 60) argues, are especially *important* when: (a) there is an urgent need for additional revenue to upgrade quality and expand capacity; and (b) there is little or no chance for additional governmental, or taxpayer, revenue for the public higher education sector. Tuition fees are generally thought to be *equitable* when: (c) higher education is partaken of by very few, and disproportionately by the children of more affluent parents; (d) the costs of (public) higher education are overwhelmingly borne by all citizens through direct or indirect taxation; and (e) provision is made for means-tested grants and generally available loans or all truly qualified students. All of these conditions (except “e”) are present in virtually all African countries, making some form of tuition fees in public higher education critical for expanding capacity and promoting more equitable participation. Yet tuition as a policy is still extremely controversial and hence absent in most of the countries of the African continent —with the exception mainly of South Africa and of the aforementioned dual, or parallel, or privately-sponsored, tuition fees in East Africa and Ethiopia.

In this context of slowly emerging cost-sharing in Africa, research was conducted at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania from January to May 2003 to study the implementation of cost sharing policies in higher education in Tanzania. The University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’s oldest and largest public university, with more than ten years experience of implementing cost sharing and revenue diversification, was used as a case study. The Government’s professed objectives for re-introducing cost sharing in higher education were used as indicators. The research addressed the following questions:

1. To what extent has the Tanzanian Government actually implemented (through the 2002-03 academic year) its stated cost-sharing objectives of: (a) expanding participation in higher education, (b) requiring beneficiaries of higher education contribute to its costs, and (c) making student hostels and cafeterias operate more efficiently?
2. What has been the additional non-governmental income generated by the University of Dar es Salaam from these early steps of cost sharing, and what has been the impact on the institution’s net revenue and capacity expansion?
3. What has been the seeming impact of any net increase in revenue and/or capacity on expanded access to this university?²

¹ These policies have a counterpart in the US, which is a country not at all opposed to tuition fees, but in which some tuition fee-dependent private colleges and universities practice (although not always acknowledging) enrollment management, or what Johnstone (2001a: 9) calls *tilting admissions and enrollments toward students who can pay*.

² An additional question still to be examined in the larger research program, but not reported in this article, concerns access to higher education. The Government of Tanzania defines expanded access to higher education as *availability* and *affordability* of higher education to *more people* than hitherto. Our further

Cost Sharing in Higher Education

The conventional rationales for cost sharing and revenue diversification in higher education worldwide are three: (1) greater equity, both through a better alignment of those who bear the costs and those who reap the benefits as well as through the expanded participation of those who had formerly been left out; (2) improved efficiency of both systems and institutions as well as improved producer responsiveness to both the student and the society; and (3) what may be the most important--and certainly less controversial--rationale: the sheer need for other-than-governmental revenue for expanded quality, access and participation (Johnstone 2002b, 2003a, 20004a, 2004b; World Bank, 1994).

The rationale for expanded participation, and thus improved equity, is based on two propositions: First, the added revenue from additional tuition, even after some additional grants or discounts, can expand capacity--both for classroom instruction and for living accommodations--and thereby increase participation. The principal measures of expanded capacity are the numbers and seating capacity of new instructional facilities, and the bed space of new living accommodations. Second, the added revenue can be stretched to more students—and thus to even greater participation--by providing loans, which in turn can put more revenue into the hands of needy students (at least for the present value of the dollar) than can grants or tuition discounts.

The second presumed rationale--the presumption of greater internal efficiency and producer responsiveness (institutional efficiency) with the advent of tuition fees--is thought to come about as more of the higher education costs are borne by the consumers or buyers (i.e. students and their parents): a phenomenon that infuses into higher education some virtues of the market (Johnstone, 2003a: 355). The major assumption is that payment of tuition or other related higher education costs will make students and their families more discerning consumers--and universities more cost-conscious providers. The notion of producer responsiveness is premised on the assumption that cost-sharing through tuition and other related costs would make universities more responsive to the individual, societal, and labor market demands.

Finally, proponents of *sheer need* rationale claim that public institutions of higher education must increasingly supplement their governmental revenue through cost-sharing and other revenue diversification activities due to decreasing public resources allocated to these institutions, which are already overwhelmed by high demand pressure for higher education. This demand pressure is a function of demographic increases as well as the expansion in the traditional college-age cohort to include non-traditional students (such as mature age entrants and private candidates in Tanzania), compounded by the increasing number of secondary school graduates who are academically qualified and want to pursue higher education. The decline in available tax-based public resources to higher education, especially in developing countries like Tanzania, may be due to competition of public higher education sector with other politically and socially compelling needs such as health care, or clean water supply.

research will look at the socio-economic, regional, and gender impacts of the Government's early tentative steps toward the implementation of cost-sharing at the University of Dar es Salaam.

Re-instituting Cost-Sharing in Higher Education in Tanzania

Cost-sharing in higher education is not new to Tanzania. The policy had existed since the colonial period and in post-independence Tanzania until 1967 when the Government adopted African Socialism. However, during the colonial period and even after independence, students in higher education institutions paid tuition fees, and students from poor families were assisted through government bursaries (URT, 1998: 75-76).

In 1967, the Government decided to grant bursaries to all students admitted to what was then the only public university, the University College of Dar es Salaam. In 1974, the Government abolished the bursary system and assumed all the responsibilities of paying for all higher education costs for students admitted in public higher education institutions. (The University continued the practice of charging a tuition fee, but charged it only to the government—thus making the tuition fee the accounting equivalent of a per-student governmental appropriation.)

Cost-sharing in higher education in Tanzania was officially reinstated in the late 1980's largely due to the Government's inability to finance free public higher education in addition to all of the other pressing public needs. Some movement towards greater cost-sharing was part of the wide-ranging economic and social reforms under the IMF/World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment programs. The Government first decided upon a course of cost-sharing in higher education in 1988, but for political expedience made its formal announcement of the policy in January 1992.³ In the Government's announcement, it was argued that the introduction of cost-sharing in higher education had become *necessary* in order to maintain the quality of academic programs, to encourage needy students to attend higher education, and to improve access to higher education, while at the same time containing government expenditures in higher education (URT, op. cit. 76).

The new policy was to be implemented in phases over a number of years according to the following schedule:

- *Phase I* of the implementation of cost-sharing started in 1992-93 academic year. In this phase students and parents were required to pay for their own transportation, application and registration fees, entry examination fees, student union fees, and *caution money* (deposits for covering breakage and other small debts owed the university). In addition, small numbers of privately-sponsored students—admissible but not scoring high enough to qualify for governmental sponsorship—were admitted on the payment of tuition fees.
- *Phase II* was implemented during 1993-94 academic year. In this phase, students were required to pay for food and accommodation. The higher education allowance paid to students in public higher education institutions was also eliminated during this phase, and the Government also introduced student loans to cover accommodation and meal costs. These loans are accessible by all Tanzanian

³ There were the first multiparty general elections in 1990 and probably the government did not want to give the opposition political parties an agenda for their campaign.

students admitted in public universities and accredited private universities and colleges.

- *Phase III*--which has not yet begun as of the end of 2003, and has no avowed official starting date-- will require students to pay for tuition and examination fees, books and stationery costs, special projects costs, field practice expenses, and medical insurance in addition to the costs mentioned in phases I and II. The Government at present retains the responsibility of paying for the above costs.

Cost-sharing in higher education in Tanzania, then, has so far taken the following forms:

1. introduction of a very limited tuition fee in public higher education institutions charged only to students not eligible for the official governmentally-sponsored tuition free places (i.e. the so-called *dual track* tuition program);
2. imposition of some more substantial user charges for food and accommodation;
3. abolition of students' stipends and allowances;
4. official encouragement of tuition dependent private higher education sector (as of 2003, still very limited); and
5. introduction of various revenue diversification activities in public higher education institutions as well as privatization, or commercialization, of some of the students' and university's municipal services.

Participation and Access at the University of Dar es Salaam

A principal objective of cost-sharing in Tanzania was to increase participation and accessibility to all institutions of higher education, including the flagship university of Dar es Salaam. However, there has been only a very slight increase in undergraduate admission rates and a modest expansion in total undergraduate enrollments for the past eleven years at the University of Dar es Salaam and in the other three public universities. The tentative beginnings of cost sharing seem not to have had any impact on enrollments, either positive (i.e. from the additional revenue) or negative (i.e. from the increased fees). In fact, however, these slight increases do not even reflect the increasing numbers of high school graduates over the years or the increasing numbers of applicants with minimum qualifications for admission, and they do not generally reflect the Tanzanian population growth from 23.1 m in 1988 to 34.6 in 2002. The current admission rates also do not reflect the increase in total student enrollments in high schools, which constitute the potential university entrants, public and private, and which increased from 10,562 in 1991 to 24,807 in 2001 (a 5 percent increase).

Table 1 shows high school examination results in number and percentages by divisions, or categories of examination scores, from 1991-2001, while Table 2 shows trends in undergraduate admissions vis-à-vis applicants with minimum entry qualifications (Divisions I, II, and III) at the University of Dar es Salaam from 1989/90-2003/2004. Table 3 shows trends in undergraduate enrollment at the University of Dar es Salaam and other public universities. Table 4 summarizes available data on the number of privately sponsored students from 1992/93-2003/04.

Table 1
High School Examination Results by Division 1991-2001(Public and Private Schools) ^a

Year	Division ^b					Total # of Candidates	No. Qualified for Admission (Div. I, II, & III)
	I	II	III	IV	Failed		
1991	825 (16.3%)	1285 (25.4%)	2038 (40.2%)	669 (13.3%)	241 (4.8%)	5,058	4,148 (82. %)
1992	611 (10.9%)	1221 (21.8%)	2442 (43.6%)	924 (16.5%)	403 (7.2%)	5,601	4,274 (76.3%)
1993	547 (8.7%)	1371 (21.8%)	3082 (49.0%)	937 (14.9%)	352 (5.6%)	6,289	5,000 (79.5%)
1994	279 (4.7%)	747 (12.6%)	2652 (44.7%)	1382 (23.3%)	872 (14.7%)	5,932	3,678 (62.0%)
1995	314 (5.2%)	807 (13.4%)	2824 (46.9%)	1146 (20.7%)	830 (13.8%)	6,021	3945 (65.5%)
1996	518 (9.0%)	1164 (20.2%)	2760 (47.9%)	887 (15.4%)	449 (7.8%)	5778	4,442 (77.0%)
1997	609 (9.4%)	1335 (20.6%)	2935 (45.3%)	972 (15.0%)	628 (9.7%)	6,479	4,879 (75.3%)
1998	773 (10.7%)	1488 (20.6%)	3213 (44.5%)	1148 (15.9%)	599 (8.3%)	7,221	5,474 (76.0%)
1999	702 (8.8%)	1733 (21.7%)	3689 (46.2%)	1246 (15.6%)	615 (7.7%)	7,985	6,124 (77%)
2000	805 (8.4%)	2223 (23.2%)	4791 (50.0%)	1246 (13.0%)	508 (5.3%)	9,573*	7,819 (82.0%)
2001	1108 (10.4%)	2910 (27.3%)	4754 (44.6%)	1503 (14.1%)	394 (3.7%)	10,670*	8,773 (82.2%)

Sources: Adapted from: United Republic of Tanzania, (1996) *Basic Statistics in Education 1991-1995 National Data* p.21; *Basic Statistics in Education 1992-1996 National Data* p.24; *Basic Statistics in Education 1997-2001 National Data* p.29

Notes:

- a. Exclude those who sit for high school final exams outside the formal school system as private candidates.
- b. High school final exam results are classified into Divisions depending on points obtained from principal and subsidiary subjects examined (A=5, B=4, etc.). Division I is the highest, obtained by scoring A's in major subjects. Division I is a virtual guarantee of admission in public universities under Government sponsorship (free higher education). The figures for examination results divisions were given as % in the sources cited above, but recalculated into actual numbers. *For 2000 and 2001 years the total number of high school graduates given in the sources is 9,581 and 10,661 but calculations by using the % given for each division, gives a total number of 9,573 for 2000 and 10,670 for 2001.

Table 1 reveals that the total number of high school graduates increased from 5,058 in 1991 to 10,670 in 2001, an increase of 111 percent. During the same period, the number of high school graduates qualified for admission into higher educational institutions increased from 4,148 to 8,773, an increase of 111.4 percent. The percentage of the candidates with minimum and maximum qualifications for admission into higher education institutions--i.e. candidates who passed in Divisions I, II, and III--ranged between 62 and 82.2 percent of the total candidates graduating from high schools, while the number and percent of high school graduates obtaining maximum qualifications (Division I) for admission into Governmentally-sponsored places in public universities declined from 825 (16.4 percent) in 1991 to 703 (8.8 percent) in 1999 before marginally increasing from 805 (8.4 percent) in 2000 to 1,108 (10.4 percent) in 2001. The declining trend in number and percentages of graduates obtaining Division I can be attributed to the

increasingly tough examinations set by the National Examination Council of Tanzania (NECTA): ostensibly as a means of improving secondary education quality and standards, *but in practice (and probably in intent) limiting the costly allocation of expensive tuition-free places.*

The more double increases in the total number of high school graduates reported in Table 1, which reached 10,670 in 2001 in a period of eleven years (for both public and private schools), do not reflect or translate to expanded access to advanced secondary education, a *sine qua non* for access to higher education. In fact, the total number of high school graduates in 2001 was only 0.03 percent of total Tanzania Mainland population (33.5m) in 2002. This is not surprising because Tanzania, having few unevenly distributed secondary schools (only 1,044 in 2002), has abysmally low participation rates in secondary education, even when compared only to other countries in Sub Saharan Africa: Only 6 percent of the age cohort in 2000 compared to 19 percent in Uganda and 31 percent in Kenya (World Bank, 2003: 80-82).

An important question is why Tanzania, compared to Kenya and Uganda (and forty-three years after independence in 1961), still has such a low participation rate in secondary education? There seem to be two major reasons. First, compared to other education sub-sectors such as basic, teacher, and tertiary and higher education, the Government has not been allocating adequate financial resources to public secondary education. For example, the percentage share of total allocation to the secondary education sub-sector declined from 9.5 percent in 1994-95 to 7.6 percent in 1999-2000; this is compared to the *increase* from 20.1 percent to 23.4 percent for tertiary and higher education sub- sector (URT, 2002f: 70). Interestingly, the inadequate allocation of resources to public secondary education sub-sector has already necessitated the introduction of some forms of cost sharing at this level. The second reason may be that until the late 1980's, when Tanzania abandoned central planning and socialism altogether, secondary school expansion was linked only to the nation's manpower requirements. For this reason, secondary school expansion was deliberately controlled and regulated by the Government. The Government also controlled access to the first level of public secondary education through a quota system.

Table 2 shows trends in the University of Dar es Salaam undergraduate admissions vis-à-vis applicants with minimum and maximum entry qualifications from 1989/90 to 2003-04. These data depict the very low admission rates at the University of Dar es Salaam for the past fifteen years. In fact, for some years (e.g. 1989-90 through 1996-97), admissions were almost stagnant, hovering slightly above 1,000 students per academic year. The decline of the admission rate from 40.2 to 35 percent from 1989-90 to 1990-91 can be attributed partly to the fact the University of Dar es Salaam was closed for continuing students for the whole 1990-91 academic year because of a student strike in April 1990. But we have no explanation of why admission rates dropped from 41 percent in 1991-92 to only 32.6 percent in 1996-97 academic year. The 2555 students admitted in 2002-03 is the number of candidates who were admitted under Government sponsorship following a Government directive to the UDSM that the number of candidates to be selected for its sponsorship *should not exceed 2,555*. Data on the number of candidates admitted under privately sponsorship program for this academic year were not available to the author, but if the University had not admitted privately sponsored

students in the 2003-04 academic year, admissions would have declined by -27.6 percent-
-from 3,531 undergraduates in 2002-03 to 2,555.⁴

Table 2.
University of Dar es Salaam Undergraduate Admissions vis-à-vis Applicants
with Minimum Entry Qualifications, 1989/90-2003/04

Year	Applied	Admitted	% Admitted
1989/90	2,578	1,037	40.2
1990/91	2,850	994	35.0
1991/92	2,644	1,081	41.0
1992/93	3,407	1,136	33.4
1993/94	3,711	1,243	33.5
1994/95	3,058	1,147	37.5
1995/96	3,800	1,280	33.7
1996/97	4,100	1,339	32.6
1997/98	4,233	1,607	38.0
1998/99	4,992	1,805	36.1
1999/00	5,132	2,457	48.0
2000/01	n.a	3,000	n.a
2001/02	n.a	2,950	n.a
2002/03	n.a	3,531	n.a
2003/04	8,000	2,555*	32.0

Sources: Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals in Tanzania (1997, p. 54); University of Dar es Salaam-Admissions Office, May 2003; University of Dar es Salaam (2003) "Selection of Candidates for Government Sponsorship 2003-04" Letter from the Chief Academic Officer to the Faculty Deans and Principals of Constituent Colleges, Ref. Z17/A.P2003 March 23rd 2003; University of Dar es Salaam, *Minutes of the 151st Meeting of the University Council Held on June 9th 2002* p. 13; University of Dar es Salaam, *Minutes of the 148th Meeting of the University Council Held on November 22nd 2001* p. 25; Higher Education Accreditation Council (HEAC) (2001) *HEAC Newsletter*, Vol. 1. No.1 p. 11

Notes:

n.a. data not available

* = applicants to be admitted on Government sponsorship only as per the directive from the Chief Academic Officer in the letter cited above.

⁴ The modest increase in enrollments at the University of Dar es Salaam as revealed in Table 2 may actually be even lower due to the allegedly increasing number of forged certificates and diplomas submitted by applicants for admission into various programs. Parallel to the submission of forged certificates for admission purposes, the continuing students in 2nd, 3rd, and 4th years have also been netted with forged certificates (Kalembo, 2003: 16).

Furthermore, the very fluctuating admission rates shown in Table 2 do not at all reflect the increase in the total number of high school graduates, which more than doubled from 5,058 in 1991 to 10,670 in 2001, or the total number of high school graduates with minimum entry qualifications, which also more than doubled from 4,148 to 8,773 during the same period. Nor do the admission rates revealed in Table 2 reflect the general increasing social demand for university education in Tanzania, which may be manifested in the increasing number of applicants for admission at the University of Dar es Salaam, which rose from 2,578 in 1989-90 to 8,000 in 2003-04 an increase of 210 percent.

The above observations bring us to some important questions concerning access to higher education in Tanzania, and in particular to the flagship University of Dar es Salaam: Where do applicants who do not get admitted, or who get admitted but do not secure Government sponsorship and are unable to pay private sponsorship tuition fees, go? What could be the possible explanation for low admission rates at the UDSM given the high and unsatisfied social demand for university education manifested by the increasing number of university places?

There are four possible answers to the first question. It is likely that many applicants who do not get admitted, or who got admitted but who did not secure Government funding, apply for admission in other less prestigious and cheaper public non-university institutions in the following academic year. Some may re-apply to join the University in the following academic year after re-sitting final high school examinations to improve their scores above the cut-off points for admission into Government sponsored programs. Some may apply to enter private universities. And some may simply abandon their plans to pursue higher education.

However, admission rates for public non-university institutions and private universities combined are very also very low. For example, in 2001-2002 academic year, the 15 public non-university institutions admitted 2,475 students in their undergraduate programs, while the 11 private universities and colleges admitted 787 students. Thus, the number of students who do not get admission either at the UDSM or the other public universities in each academic year is too large to be accommodated by the public non-university institutions and the private universities.

Some possible answers for low admission numbers at the UDSM revealed in Table 2 are suggested here below. In the first place, the admission criteria, or standards, by which so many of the secondary school test takers are weeded out may simply be too high, given the current realities of poorly paid and poorly motivated teachers in addition to inadequate teaching-learning facilities in many secondary schools in Tanzania, especially public secondary schools.

But a second explanation, alluded to above, is that the admissions standards are being pushed higher deliberately to keep the numbers of new enrollments low. In reality, the “cut-off point” on the entrance examination is not driven upward by any true academic standard, but rather merely by the need to limit the number of new students to fit the number of available places—which in turn is limited by too few hostel and teaching-learning spaces and by too few faculty compared to the increasing number of potentially qualified applicants. For example, after its establishment as a national

university in 1970, the University of Dar es Salaam did not construct or procure any new student hostels or lecture theaters until 1998, when it procured two student hostels and constructed one new hostel through an external private investor and constructed two additional lecture theaters. Even with these additional facilities, however, anecdotal evidence from students suggests that residential facilities, classrooms, laboratories and libraries are still inadequate and congested. More telling is that the number of the teaching staff at the University of Dar es Salaam's Main Campus actually declined from 594 in 1997-98 to 539 in 2001-2002, and at Muhimbili College of Health Sciences (MUCHS) from 198 in 1997-98 to 180 in 2000/01 (URT, 2002c: 103-104).

Underlying the rising cut-off point on the entrance examination and the consequent low numbers admitted to the coveted governmentally-sponsored, or tuition free, places is the declining ability of the Government to sponsor all the qualified students who would formerly have been admitted to these places. At the same time, few households are able to pay the fees for the newly added privately-sponsored, or fee-paying, places. The mean per-capita household monthly income on the Tanzanian mainland in 2000-01 was TZS 17,928 [US\$ 39], or TZS 215,136 [US\$ 473] per year (National Bureau of Statistics, 2002).⁵ The tuition fee for privately-sponsored students at the University of Dar es Salaam (at least until recently, when it was forced to be lowered) was TZS 1,000,000 [US\$2,198]—clearly far beyond the reach of the average Tanzanian family. The implications of households' inability to pay fees charged by public universities for access and expanded participation have been acknowledged by the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM, 1997: 47; 2001: 121; & 2002e: 123).

New Admission Policy, Government Sponsorship Criteria and the Paradox of Expanding Access to Higher Education

The Government since the 2002-03 academic year has imposed a cap (quota) on the number of students to be admitted on its sponsorship at the University of Dar es Salaam in each degree program and faculty. For example, in 2002-03, a total of 3,531 students were admitted, but the Government decided to sponsor only 2,358 students for the Main Campus, 300 at the Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences, and 270 students at the University College of Lands and Architectural Sciences for a total of only 2928 students, leaving 603 students without sponsorship.⁶ After an intensive discussion with University administration and pressure from the students' union, the Government agreed to sponsor the remaining students 603 students under the condition that the University lower its per-student charges for the Governmentally-sponsored students (like a *tuition fee* but charged only to the Government) from a range of TZS 900,000 - 1,500,000 [US\$1978 – \$3296] depending on the academic program to a flat charge, or *tuition fee*, of TZS 750,000 [US\$1648] per student per year (UDSM, 2002a: 13; 2002d: 1). Thus, the University's finances were constrained not only by what was still a limited number of admissions, but also by a reduced per-capita payment, or *tuition fee*, for each of the governmentally-sponsored students.

⁵ Conversion from Tanzanian Shillings to US dollars via 2001 Purchasing Power Parity computed at \$1 =TZS455.06.

⁶ The issue of 603 students admitted by the University but were not sponsored by the Government became a big political issue with opposition parties calling the Government irresponsible and University students threatening to call a massive strike if the Government did not agree to sponsor the above students.

For the most recent academic year (2003-04), the Government issued a directive to the University that selection of candidates for Government sponsorship should not exceed 2,555 students in the following distribution: Bachelor of Arts (General) 400; Bachelor of Arts with Education 200; Bachelor of Education 260; Bachelor of Commerce 290; Bachelor of Engineering 315; Bachelor of Science 420; Doctor of Medicine and related courses 250; and University College of Lands and Architectural Studies 250 (UDSM, 2003b).

In response to the new Government policy for student sponsorship, the University of Dar es Salaam established criteria for Government sponsorship and raised the minimum cut-off points for admission into individual degree programs, effective July 2002. Priority for Government sponsorship is to be given in consideration of:

- sustaining and allowing for gradual growth of those degree programs that are new and have few students;
- supporting education and training programs of high national priority and professional programs where there is currently a clear national shortfall; and
- recognizing the need for more female candidates, who will be given due priority (UDSM, 2002c: 1).

Consequently, the minimum entry cut-off points, which were 4 to 4.5 for females and 5 for males for direct entrants, have been raised to between 6.5 and 10.5 points depending on the degree program. In the Faculty of Commerce and Management, for example, the cut-off point in 2003-04 is 8.5 for males and 6.5 for females; in the Faculty of Law, it is 10.5 for males and 9.5 for females; and in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, it is 9 for males and 7.5 for females (UDSM, 2002c: 2). The rise of minimum cut-off points for admission into Government-sponsored places will surely further lower admission rates and lead to increasingly restricted access to free higher education.

Table 3 shows trends in total undergraduate student enrollment at the University of Dar es Salaam and other public universities in Tanzania Mainland from 1989-90 to 2001-2002. Under-graduate student enrollment at the University of Dar es Salaam increased from 2,839 (1989-90) to 7,801 (2001-2002), an increase of 174.7 percent. While statistically this increase seems huge, considering the fact that this is an increase over the period of 13 years makes it in no way very significant. In fact, the total student enrollment of 7,801 reached by the UDSM in 2001-2002 academic year was only 0.02% of the total population of Tanzania Mainland, and UDSM total enrollment plus total enrollments in other public universities (7,246 students) in 2001-2002 were only 0.04% of the population.

The very modest growth in student enrollments at the UDSM, especially from 1998-99 to 2001-2002, can be attributed mainly to the University's increase in capacity: construction of a new student hostel through the external private investor⁷ and acquisition of two more hostels with funds obtained from the Government (taxes). The new student hostel was constructed by the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) at a cost of TZS 16,473,396,379 [US\$ 36,200,490] to be recovered at an interest rate of 7.5 percent

⁷ The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) is an autonomous government owned parastatal organization.

annually for the ten-year period starting from year 2002. The new hostel can accommodate 4,309 students, while the two other hostels can accommodate 2,532 students (UDSM, 2002b: 1; UDSM 1999: 16). The three newly acquired student hostels thus have a total capacity for of some 6,841 students, although UDSM current enrollments do not reflect any such expanded capacity—and anecdotal evidence shows that student accommodation facilities are still inadequate.

Table 3
Undergraduate Student Enrollments at the UDSM
and Other Public Universities⁸ in Tanzania, 1989/90-2001/2002

Year	UDSM	Other
1989/90	2,839	n.a
1990/91 ⁹	331	n.a
1991/92	2,801	n.a
1992/93	2,992	n.a
1993/94	2,968	n.a
1994/95	3,869	n.a
1995/96	4,308	3,996
1996/97	4,519	4,851
1997/98	4,920	5,853
1998/99	5,221	6,848
1999/00	6,073	6,592
2000/01	6,674	7313
2001/02	7,801	7246

Sources: United Republic of Tanzania (1998) *Financial Sustainability ...*, p. 24); United Republic of Tanzania, *Some Basic Statistics...*(2000 pp. 3-7); United Republic of Tanzania *Some Basic Statistics...* (2002 pp. 1-6.)

Privately-Sponsored, or Dual Track, or Fee-Paying Students

The practice of admitting privately-sponsored students--at first, mostly foreigners and institutionally supported ones rather than those paying for themselves or paid for by their parents--at the University of Dar es Salaam dates back to the early 1980's¹⁰ when the University started admitting very few institutionally-sponsored students on a private basis. By 1992-93 when cost-sharing policy became officially operational, the University had a total enrollment of one hundred and six (106) third party/privately-sponsored

⁸ Other public universities include: Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) and the Open University of Tanzania (OUT). Until 2001-02 academic year Tanzania had only three public universities.

⁹ The University of Dar es Salaam was closed for this academic year because of student strikes.

¹⁰ The author's personal experience as an undergraduate student at the University of Dar es Salaam in the early 1980's was that there were a handful of privately-sponsored students in fields such as education and arts and social sciences, mainly sponsored by the Bukoba Cooperative Union (BCU), which owns a number of private secondary schools in Kagera region. For this reason, BCU had to sponsor teachers at the UDSM for its schools (an arrangement that continues to date).

students (mostly foreigners and institutionally supported) while the Institute of Finance Management (a non-university public higher education institution) had a total enrollment of 560 students under third party/privately-sponsored students (mostly in-service institutionally supported ones) (CVCPT, 1997: 65).

The *formal* and *official* proposal for admitting privately-sponsored Tanzanian students at the undergraduate level at the University of Dar es Salaam was first submitted to the University Council 121st Meeting on March 7, 1996 and approved on the same date. The Council approved the proposal to admit privately-sponsored Tanzanian candidates in order to open access to university-level education to as many people as possible—which was in line both with the national higher education policy and with the University of Dar es Salaam's Corporate Strategic Plan to increase the overall student enrollment to 8,000 by the year 2000 (UDSM, 1996: 24).

Following the Government's policy of imposing a quota on the number of students it was willing to sponsor each academic year, the University began in 2002-03 formally to admit two categories of students: those who would be sponsored by the Government, and those who would have to find private sponsorship from parents, extended families, or other sources. Thus, the University would be able to add students above the limited governmentally-sponsored quotas. The 151st University Council meeting on September 6, 2002 officially recommended that the University admit privately-sponsored students depending on the number of governmentally-sponsored students, any remaining vacancies to be filled if possible by privately-sponsored, tuition fee-paying students--and furthermore, that the fee structure be reviewed to attract more privately-sponsored students (UDSM, 2002b: 33). The University identified the potential clientele for privately –sponsored, or dual track, programs as: (1) affluent individual Tanzanian parents, (2) local government councils, (3) cooperative unions, (4) non-governmental organizations, (5) private companies, (6) religious organizations, (7) various registered local development organizations, and (8) Tanzania's parastatal organizations (UDSM, 1996 op. cit). The University also implemented a different privately-sponsored program for the sons, daughters, and spouses of its staff and members of the University Council. The beneficiaries of this special privately sponsored program, which started in 2002-2003 academic year, are entitled to a 50 percent tuition fee exemption (UDSM, 1998: 22-23).

The marginal increase in admissions at the UDSM shown in Table 4 cannot be attributed to cost-sharing because of the small number of privately-sponsored students. Moreover, most potential students seem to be interested only in admission with Government sponsorship. For example, out of 2,757 students' in our study sample, only 91 students, or just over 3 percent, were admitted on fee-paying basis. Also, there is no evidence to show that the University deliberately and strategically attempted to implement what Johnstone (2001a) calls *tilting* admissions and enrollments towards students who can pay, or maximizing the enrollments of fee-paying students, as has been the case with Makerere and Nairobi universities.

Table 4.
Number of Privately-Sponsored Students in
Undergraduate Studies at UDSM, 1992/93-2001/2002

Year	Number Enrolled	% of total Enrollment
1992/93	106	3.5
1993/94	111	3.9
1994/95	117	3.0
1995/96	100	2.3
1996/97	103	2.3
1997/98	47	0.9
1998/99	162	3.1
1999/00	n.a	n.a
2000/01	n.a	n.a
2001/02	289 ^a	3.7

Sources: Committee of Vice Chancellors and Principals in Tanzania (CVPT) (1998: p.65; URT (2002) *Some Basic Statistics on Higher Learning Institutions in Tanzania*, p. 151; UDSM (2000b) Minutes of the 139th Meeting of the University Council Held on March 10th 2000. Council Memorandum No. 139.2.4 Report of the Income Generation Unit October-December 31st 1999.

a. These figures are for the Main Campus only. Enrollment figures for the two constituent colleges were not available. These figures also include those who are sponsored by organizations such as Carnegie Corporation of New York, non-governmental organizations, private sector, and Human Resources Development Trust Fund administered by the Prospective College of Engineering and Technology.

Despite the existence of privately-sponsored program for the past twelve years, despite the enormous need for supplemental revenue, and despite the large and increasing numbers of high school graduates who pass the minimal entrance qualifications but who do not qualify for governmental sponsorship, the enrollments in this program have remained very low. In 2001-02, privately-sponsored students at the main campus of the University of Dar es Salaam numbered only 289, or 3.7 percent.¹¹ In fact, in all years of admitting privately-sponsored students through 2002-03, the University of Dar es Salaam has enrolled only approximately 1,200 privately-sponsored, fee-paying students (Kisembo, 2003).

Enrollments in privately-sponsored programs in other public universities and non-university institutions, according to data compiled for the first time in 2001-02 academic year, are also low, although at the Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences (MUCHS), one of the University's constituent colleges, is slightly higher at 25, or 8 percent of first year enrollment, and the newest public university, Mzumbe, elevated from the status of an institute only in 2002, is considerably larger, with 363 students, or 34 percent of its entering class, entering on a fee-paying, or privately-sponsored, basis (URT

¹¹ The actual numbers of additional Tanzanian young persons able to attend Dar es Salaam and other institutions of higher education through the privately-sponsored programs may be even lower, as it is said that foreigners and institutions rather than parents, households or individuals purchase most of the available privately-sponsored slots.

2002c: 151). Overall, privately-sponsored enrollments are greater in the public *non-universities*—averaging a little more than 12 percent—but the total number is still small: some 383 out of a total public non-university enrollment of some 3136 in 2001-2002.

The major reason there is more private sponsorship (cost sharing) in public non-university higher education institutions than in the University of Dar es Salaam (including its two constituent colleges) and the other Tanzanian universities is probably because the public non-university institutions charge lower tuition fees (for both the privately- and the governmentally-sponsored students). For example, tuition fees in the non-university institutions in 2002-03 ranged between TZS 217,000 and TZS 1,044,200 [US\$ 477 and \$ 2,295] per year. In contrast, tuition fees for privately-sponsored students at Dar es Salaam and the other public universities (other than Open University of Tanzania) charged between TZS 600,000 and 1,500,000 [US\$ 1319 and \$ 3296] per year, the high tuition being that charged by Muhimbili University College of Health Sciences (MUCHS) (HEAC, *ibid.*16-28).

Compared to the Makerere and Nairobi success stories of privately-sponsored, or *parallel*, programs elsewhere in East Africa, enrollments in the fee-paying program at the University of Dar es Salaam are miniscule. Considering that some of the privately sponsored vacancies at the University of Dar es Salaam and perhaps in other public universities are likely to be purchased by foreigners or foreign institutions (e.g. the US Carnegie Corporation or Rockefeller Foundation) rather than Tanzanian individuals or households, the number is even lower, and the entire policy of cost-sharing through privately-sponsored, or dual track, tuition fees in Tanzanian public universities becomes even murky, if not elusive.

This low number of privately-sponsored students may be explained in part by the fact that students admitted on a privately-sponsored, fee-paying basis must have taken the mandatory matriculation examination and passed with at least the minimum entry qualifications (at different cut-off points in accordance with respective degree program requirements). But the low numbers seem to extend beyond limited supply to a limited demand: The majority of Tanzanians apparently are simply unwilling to pay and enroll in this program (demand). Although some Tanzanian parents are paying for their children to attend private secondary education in expensive private and international schools and mushrooming academies in urban Tanzania, as well as paying tuition fees for universities in neighboring countries such as Kenya and Uganda, and even in Europe and USA, it seems the majority of Tanzanian parents are evidently not prepared to have to purchase higher education offered by public universities.¹²

For the purpose of strengthening the emerging Tanzanian policy of higher educational cost-sharing, it would seem instructive to consider why Tanzanians, compared to Kenyans and Ugandans, are purchasing so far fewer privately-sponsored places offered in public universities? Part of the explanation may lay in the fact that the

¹² Student files at the University of Dar es Salaam also revealed that some students—even from rich and well placed families, top civil servants, politicians (retired and in active service)—who were admitted as self- or privately-sponsored students in their first year, were offered Government sponsorship in their second year after their parents requested or indirectly pressured the top University and Ministry of Science, Technology, and Higher Education to do so under such excuses as both parents being retrenched from their jobs, or having their businesses gone bankrupt.

three countries took different political and economic paths after their independence. Kenya and Uganda maintained free market economies, which encouraged private entrepreneurship and the establishment of private schools and higher education institutions. In addition, Kenya still maintains a pre-colonial cultural tradition of “*harambee*,” meaning: “let us pull together,” in which the community contributes to funds and labor needed for school construction and even mobilizing funds to meet higher education costs of a son or daughter of a community member admitted to a local or a foreign higher education institution, but whose parents are unable to meet the costs because of poverty or some other reasons. The concept of cost-sharing in higher education, then, has fundamentally existed in Kenya and Uganda since the colonial times.

Tanzania, on the other hand, maintained a free market economy and free enterprise system only for the first six years after independence (1961-1967). In 1967, Tanzania adopted African Socialism: abolishing free enterprises, nationalizing all privately-owned educational institutions (except Catholic seminaries and one Catholic tertiary education institution) and all major means of production, and ending the payment of fees in schools and publicly-owned higher education institutions. From 1967 up to the late 1980’s, when cost sharing in higher education policy was officially adopted, Tanzanians enjoyed free public higher education in tandem with free social services generally, such as free medical care.

While it is true that the majority of Tanzanian households cannot pay the kinds of fees charged by Universities because of their poverty, it is to a great extent the cultural values and other “hangovers” of the socialist expectation of free social services that militates against paying a tuition fee at a public higher education institutions. It is because of this expectation of “free higher education”--a mentality also shared among students--that the University of Dar es Salaam Council Chairman recently urged all Tanzanians in strong terms, to “...*cultivate the habit of paying for fees for their children’s higher education.*” The Chairman further observed “...if this call goes unheeded, we should not be surprised to see the large number of privately-sponsored students coming from outside Tanzania to pursue their higher education in this University” (Kisembo, 2003). The lack of habit for paying fees for their children’s higher education among Tanzanians prompted one participant at the International Conference on Financing Higher Education in Eastern and Southern Africa in March 2002 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania to advise Tanzanians that: “the ‘*harambee*’ style of funding weddings in Tanzania must be extended to the provision of education” (Mwamila, Omari and Mbuya: 2002: 28).

In fact, the Council of the University recently actually lowered the privately-sponsored tuition fees ostensibly “...*to enable more people with of an average income to pursue higher education*”--implying that tuition fees charged by the University were an impediment to access to the privately-sponsored programs in particular, and to higher education in general (Kisembo, 2003). Yet, the University had been charging what was by most measures a modest tuition fee of between TZS 600,000 and TZS 1,000,000 [US\$ 1319 and \$2198] per year for privately-sponsored students for all academic programs except for doctor of medicine degree (TZS 1,500,000 – [\$3,295], in addition to a medical capitation fee of TZS 100,000 [US\$ 220], a registration fee of TZS 5,000 [US\$ 11], and examination fee of TZS 12,000 [US\$ 26]. While the UDSM charged TZS 1,500,000

[US\$ 3,296] as a tuition fee for the doctor of medicine degree, private universities in Tanzania were charging TZS 4,520,000 [US\$ 9,933] for the same academic program (HEAC, 2000: 32-33). [Table 9 shows tuition fees (in US\$ and Tanzanian Shillings) charged by private universities in Tanzania per academic year by year 2000. (One private university, shown in Table 9, charged fees in US dollars even for Tanzanian students in Tanzania.

Cost-Sharing and Expanding Access through a Tuition-Dependent Private Higher Education Sector

The contribution of the private higher education sector to the expansion of enrollments and general access is almost negligible in Tanzania, mainly due to the limited capacity of these institutions to admit many students and also to their limited infrastructure and lack of academically qualified faculty. The 11 private universities and colleges (as of 2003) mainly offer first degree and advanced diploma courses in business administration, health sciences, law, journalism and mass communication, education, and religious studies. All except one are affiliated to religious organizations in Tanzania and abroad. These institutions were officially allowed by the Government to operate in 1997.¹³ Total enrollment in private universities and colleges increased from 545 in 1997/98 to 1,793 in 2001/02 (URT 2002c: 29-31). But it is not likely that this sector will expand very fast due to the fact that the financial sustainability of these institutions solely depends on government controlled tuition fee¹⁴ and foreign donations. Furthermore, about one-third of the admitted students do not turn up on account of lack of sponsorship (CVCPT, 1997:65). However, students admitted in accredited private universities and colleges are eligible for loans from the Government Student Loan Scheme that covers boarding and lodging costs. These loans constitute a possibly significant, although indirect, governmental subsidy—especially given the Government’s apparent inability or disinclination (at least as of 2003) to collect them.

Cost-Sharing Through “Other Fees”

Cost-Sharing may also be pursued through small, “other-than-tuition,” fees that cover, or at least contribute to, incidental institutional costs other than basic instruction. However, such student and parental contributions to higher education are currently limited to an array of small “fees” whose impact on institutional net revenue is negligible, as shown in Table 5. The government still covers all of major costs such as instruction, and most of the expenses of accommodation and meals, books and stationery, medical insurance, and field practice expenses. In fact, the comparable fees in primary and secondary education, as shown in Table 6, are higher (URT 2002a: 49). The average “fee” contribution by parents to the education of their children in Government secondary schools is TZS 156,356 (US\$ 344), while students and/or parents in public universities contribute only approximately TZS 93,200 (US\$ 205). Parents’ contribution in private secondary schools and other mushrooming educational academies and international schools are even higher.

¹³ One of the private universities, owned by the Catholic Church, together with Catholic seminaries have existed as a private tertiary education institutions since 1960.

¹⁴ Tuition fee rates set by private higher education institutions have to be approved by the Government, and institution cannot raise tuition without sending an application to the Government and securing an approval.

Table 5
Current Annual Contribution to Higher Education by Students and Parents
in Public Universities in Tanzania (TZS)

Item	Amount in Contribution
Caution Money	2,000 [US\$ 4.40]
Student Union Fee	1,200 [US\$ 2.64]
Transportation (per semester) (Mean Expenditure)	47,000 ¹⁵ [US\$ 103]
Application Fee	5,000 [US\$ 11]
Registration Fee	5,000 [US\$ 11]
Matriculation Examination Fee	15,000 [US\$ 33]
Examination Fee	12,000 [US\$ 26]
Graduation Fee	5,000 [US\$ 11]
Student ID Card	1,000 [US\$ 2.20]

Source: Field Research January-May 2003, Universities' Prospectuses

The discrepancy in parental contributions to higher and secondary education as revealed in Tables 5 and 6 supports the World Bank's long time argument that cost-sharing in education in Tanzania (as in most African countries) is currently inequitable and that the priority for more government funding should go first toward primary and secondary education, and not on higher education, which can expand its capacity with revenue generated from more realistic cost-sharing. The practical lesson here is that some number of Tanzanian households—at least those who have had children go through the secondary schools—are almost certainly capable of continuing to pay at least a comparable level of fees at the university, which is, after all, considerably more prestigious and sought-after than the high school and which returns benefits to both the student and the household.

Table 6.
Estimated Educational Costs Borne by Parents
in Government Secondary Schools (TZS)

Type of Expense	Mean Expenditure
School Fees	60,694 [US\$ 146]
School Uniforms	16,161 [US\$ 39]
Pocket Money	12,481 [US\$ 30]
Transportation	27,766 [US\$ 67]
Private Tuition	21,262 [US\$ 51]
Other Expenses	17,992 [US\$ 43]
Average Total Cost	156,356 [US\$ 375]

Source: Adapted from Omari, Issa M. (2000): p. 88.

¹⁵ Calculated from students' responses to a question on how much private money they spend on university education.

Recovering the Costs of Food and Accommodations

Another important element of the Tanzanian long-range plan for phasing in cost-sharing is the shift from entirely governmentally subsidized food and accommodations to these expenses being shared by students and parents, either at true market rates or at least requiring less governmental subsidy. Along with shifting some of the costs to students and/or parents may come an effort to make the hostels, cafeterias and other such auxiliary enterprises operate more efficiently (i.e., regardless of how the costs are shared).

The very limited available data reveals that University of Dar es Salaam's student hostels and cafeterias have not been operating more efficiently. For example, some students illegally sublet their rooms/beds to other students, yet they pay a paltry TZS 300 per day per bed (US 66¢) for their on-campus room. Therefore, rooms meant to accommodate two students are now accommodating up to five or six, some sleeping on the floors, in order to reduce expenses to individuals. Also, rooms without facilities for cooking and washing utensils are now heavily used to prepare meals with incompatible electric cooking appliances, which put pressure on standard electrical circuits leading to high consumption of electricity and at times short circuiting. Because of the above problems, the upkeep of hostels has dramatically deteriorated (URT, 2002b: 21-22). The problem of student subletting is so rampant that the University Students Accommodation Bureau (USAB), in its 9th meeting held on November 1st 2002, came up with a recommendation for fines and evictions (University of Dar es Salaam, 2002a:1).

A related problem is the extensive defaulting on room rents. For example, by September 1995, 380 undergraduate students had defaulted on room rents. After the University withheld the issuance of their certificates and academic transcripts, the number was reduced to 100. Consequently, the registration of continuing students for 1995-96 academic year was subjected to the clearing of room rent arrears by students concerned (UDSM, 1995:10). About 27 percent of student tenants defaulted on room rents between 1997 and 1999. (UDSM 2000b: 17).

The University Students Accommodation Bureau (USAB), a semi-autonomous service agency established in 1999 due to the failure of the previous system in collecting room rents from students, has also not been working as efficiently as anticipated. The Bureau, which is fully owned by the University and operates under the auspices of the Income Generation Unit (IGU), had to be subsidized by the Government at TZS 450,000,000 [US\$ 988,881] to meet its operational costs in 2002-2003 academic year (UDSM, 2002b: 7-8). The USAB is supposed to operate independently and pay for all its operational costs as well as generate income.

One of the major reasons for USAB's failure to operate independently and generate profit is that it is required to charge very low accommodation fees (TZS 300 per bed per day or US 66¢)--far below market and far below even the expenses of operation, not to exceed the Government's accommodation allowances provided to students as part of their student loans (which are not likely to be repaid anyway).

In the year 2000, USAB had proposed to the University Council that it be permitted to raise accommodation fees from TZS 300 per bed per day to TZS 600 [US 66¢ to US\$ 1.32] in order to operate profitably. The University Council approved the proposal, but it was not to be implemented until the Government raised the amount of

student loans given to students. Yet, even when the Government raised the amount of student loans in 2001, accommodation fees charged to all University of Dar es Salaam's student residential facilities remained at TZS 300 [US 66¢] (UDSM, 2002b). Apparently, the USAB will not raise the accommodation fees for fear of possible student strikes—and hence this element of cost-sharing has been badly compromised.

The limited available evidence also suggests that the student cafeterias have not been generating profits or even breaking even. In fact, data shows that the cafeterias have been making losses in all years surveyed except two, in which they made marginal profits as shown in Table 7 below.

Table 7
University of Dar es Salaam Students Cafeteria
Income and Expenditure, 1995-2000 in TZS [US\$]

Income / Expenditure	Year					
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Sale of meals	134,094,683 [448,657]	111,029,188 [368,280]	178,214,441 [559,877]	86,048,988 [248,962]	107,944,116 [278,724]	127,713,603 [306,665]
Cost of foodstuffs	196,365,367 [657,004]	171,555,136 [569,043]	145,400,169 [456,788]	91,500,861 [264,736]	131,560,183 [339,703]	107,183,735 [257,369]
Profit or Loss	-62,270,684 -[208,347]	-60,525,948 -200,763]	32,814,272 [103,089]	-5,451,873 -[15,774]	-23,616,067 -[60,979]	20,529,868 [49,296]
Gross Margin %	-46.44%	-54.51%	18.41%	-6.34%	-21.88%	16.07%

Source: Adapted from: URT (2002b). *An Evaluation of the First and Second Phases of Cost Sharing in Higher Education in Tanzania* p. 19

There are two major reasons why these cafeterias have not been making profits although they are operated by private vendors. First, the cafeterias cannot charge the equivalent of a market price on meals sold to students. Rather, the prices charged on student meals have to correspond to the amount of money paid to students by the Government as a *meals allowance*, which is only TZS 1,300 [US\$2.86] per day for breakfast, lunch, and dinner. It is feared that charging market prices on student meals would lead to a student strike. Second, most students, as pointed out above, cook their own meals in halls of residence, or alternatively buy cheaper meals from informal sources (*mama lishe*) located on and around campuses. Thus, neither the cafeteria nor the hostel operations have been able to lessen the University's dependence on governmental revenue.

Cost-Sharing and Revenue Supplementation: Are They Working at the University of Dar es Salaam?

The purpose of cost-sharing and revenue supplementation is to acknowledge the unlikelihood of significant additional Governmental, or taxpayer, revenue and to seek at least some of the additional revenue needed to expand capacity and upgrade quality from parents, students, investors, philanthropists, and other non-governmental sources. While data on non-governmental revenue generated by the University has been difficult to obtain because much of it is confidential, the available data, much of it presented in this article, suggests that there has not been enough non-governmental revenue to have any

significant addition to total net revenue in amounts sufficient to substantially increase enrollments or accessibility to Tanzania's flagship University of Dar es Salaam.

Non-governmental income generated from different revenue diversification activities and coordinated by the University's Income Generation Unit (IGU) is presented in Table 8. Total gross non-governmental income generated from different sources increased from TZS 175,993,663 [US\$ 386,748] in 1995 to TZS 851,561,682 [US\$ 1,871,317] in 2000 (an increase of 384 percent). In the same period, income from private tuition fees increased from TZS 41,898,950 [US\$ 92,073] in 1995 to TZS 611,977,434 [US\$ 1,345,000] in 2000 (an increase of 1,361percent), although this increase is not reflected in the increase in the number of privately sponsored students admitted over these years. Generally data in Table 8 indicates that private tuition fee could become a major source of non-governmental revenue for the University if strategically harnessed. Considering the University's annual budget, which from 1993-94 to 2002-2003 has ranged between TZS 8,149,135,676 [US\$ 17,907,827] to TZS 14,413,011,824 [US\$31,672,772], the amount of non-governmental revenue generated each year from 1995 to 2000 is not by any means significant; neither is the total gross non-governmental income of TZS 2,749,106,225 [US\$ 6,041,195] generated over the period of six years.

Table 8
Income Generated Through Various Activities and Sources at the University of Dar es Salaam, 1995-2000 (TZS)

Year	Source of Income					% Private Tuition Fee	% Non-Gov. Income
	Private Tuition Fee	Halls Rental Income	Cafeterias	Govt. Grants	Total Income		
1995	41,898,950 [\$92,073]	n.a	134,094,683 [\$294,674]	4,409,036,715 [\$9,688,912]	4,585,030,348 [\$10,075,661]	0.9	3.8
1996	78,285,199 [\$172,032]	896,950 [\$1,971]	111,029,188 [\$243,988]	6,392,281,713 [\$14,047,118]	6,582,493,050 [\$14,465,110]	1.2	2.9
1997	327,407,317 [\$719,481]	43,354,227 [\$95,271]	178,214,441 [\$391,628]	7,410,746,076 [\$16,285,206]	7,959,722,061 [\$17,491,588]	4.1	6.9
1998	393,755,289 [\$865,282]	46,764,899 [\$102,766]	86,048,998 [\$189,093]	6,628,862,803 [\$14,567,008]	7,155,431,989 [\$15,724,150]	5.5	7.4
1999	273,691,653 [\$601,440]	74,158,633 [\$162,964]	107,944,116 [\$237,208]	9,437,749,989 [\$20,739,572]	9,545,694,105 [\$20,976,781]	2.8	4.8
2000	611,977,434 [\$1,344,828]	111,870,645 [\$245,837]	127,713,603 [\$280,652]	10,908,361,001 258 [\$23,971]	11,163,220,908 [\$24,531,316]	5.4	7.6
Total	1,727,015,842 [\$3,795,138]	277,045,354 [\$608,810]	745,045,029 [\$1,637,245]	45,187,038,300 [\$99,299,077]	46,991,592,460 [\$103,264,607]	3.6	5.8

KEY: n.a =data not available

Source: Adapted from: United Republic of Tanzania (2002b, p. 19).

The income generated from private tuition fees is used for *topping up* of salaries of faculty involved in teaching extra workload at the department level (UDSM, 1998: 21). But this topping up of faculty salaries has not stemmed up faculty brain drain. For example, between 1990 and 1999 the University of Dar es Salaam lost 85 faculty members, including 5 professors, 5 associate professors, 10 senior lecturers, 25 lecturers, and 40 assistant lecturers (UDSM, 2002d: 6). There is no evidence to show that the non-

governmental income generated by the University over the years surveyed was invested in expanding faculty numbers, especially in the very high growth and high student demand fields such as in engineering, computer science, law, and commerce. Available data reveals that in 2002 the University had 308 unfilled faculty vacancies, including 60 at the level of professor, 54 at the level of associate professor, 87 at senior lecturer, 69 at lecturer, and 38 at the level of assistant lecturer (UDSM: 5). Nor was the net revenue used for capacity expansion—such as a new student hostel to expand access. Although there are claims that the University of Dar es Salaam was saving by 1999-00 approximately TZS 334,446,200 [US\$734,950] per year by shifting expenditures to students and families during Phase I of the cost sharing plan, there were no indications of where any savings may have been invested (URT, 2002b: 19).

At the same time, the University has undertaken various capacity expansion activities as part of implementing its Institutional Transformation Program (ITP) by using Government and private investor funds. Conceivably, this additional capacity can lead to substantial enrollment expansion, presenting the possibility for significant additional cost recovery, depending of the stance taken by the University Council toward all of the cost-sharing potential in e.g. privately-sponsored students, more reasonable rents, and more nearly market rate prices in the cafeteria, and other elements already in the future phases of the Government's long-range plans for cost-sharing and revenue diversification.

Some Conclusions and Observations about Cost Sharing in Higher Education in Tanzania

Although data remains elusive, we can make some observations and tentative conclusions about the implementation of Cost-Sharing at the University of Dar es Salaam (and by extension, the other public universities and colleges in Tanzania).

1. The low enrollments in the privately-sponsored, tuition fee-paying programs, the failure to charge even near break-even fees on the University's cafeteria and hostel operations, the proposals to give more loans to cover items that were supposed to have been covered by students and/or parents in Phase III of the Cost-Sharing Program, the apparent inability and/or unwillingness to begin serious efforts to collect on these loans, and the general reluctance by the Government to introduce Phase III of the Program are all indications that real cost-sharing in higher education in Tanzania has a long way to go.
2. Consequently, the University of Dar es Salaam remains almost totally dependent on Government subventions for recurrent budgets and foreign donations for capital development.
3. The timidity with which the Government has moved toward cost-sharing, including its increasing reliance on loans that the government as yet does not seem seriously inclined to recover, has not benefited the poor or otherwise lead to expanded participation in higher education. To the contrary, access to higher education in Tanzania compared to other East African and some other Sub-Saharan African countries is still extremely low, as manifested by low cohort participation rate and low total enrollments given the total population of Tanzania of 34.6 million.

4. The official policy of cost-sharing in higher education in Tanzania is justified on the grounds of the sheer need for non-governmental revenue for public higher education institutions because of the declining Government appropriations to these institutions, along with the dire need of expanding access to higher education to meet the ever increasing social demand.

Finally, what is needed is the political will to move forward on the track already established. The Government and the public institutions of higher education must *cultivate a habit of cost sharing in higher education*--without which the universities, even the flagship University of Dar es Salaam, will remain undernourished and unable to participate as fully as it must in the expansion of participation and opportunity for future generations of Tanzanians.

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